Let us suppose that we shall never have the Final Theory of Everythingbefore us—at least in our lifetime—and that we also remainunclear (on physical/experimental grounds) as to whether that FinalTheory will be of a type that can or cannot be deterministic. Is therenothing left that could sway our belief toward or against determinism?There is, of course: metaphysical argument. Metaphysical arguments onthis issue are not currently very popular. But philosophical fashionschange at least twice a century, and grand systemic metaphysics of theLeibnizian sort might one day come back into favor. Conversely, theanti-systemic, anti-fundamentalist metaphysics propounded byCartwright (1999) might also come to predominate. As likely as not,for the foreseeable future metaphysical argument may be just as good abasis on which to discuss determinism's prospects as any argumentsfrom mathematics or physics.


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