It is also easy to identify a number of writers, both historical andcontemporary, whose views are easily called natural law views, throughsharing all but one or two of the features of Aquinas's paradigmaticposition. Recently there have been nontheistic writers in the naturallaw tradition, who deny (1): see, for example, the work of MichaelMoore (1982, 1996) and Philippa Foot (2001). There were a number ofpost-Thomistic writers in the medieval and modern periods who in someway denied (2), the natural authority of the natural law, holding thatwhile the content of the natural law is fixed either whollyor in part by human nature, its preceptive power could onlycome from an additional divine command: the views of John Duns Scotus,Francisco Suarez, and John Locke fit this mold. Arguably the Stoics were natural law thinkers, but they seem to deny(4), holding the right to be prior to the good (see Striker1986). Some contemporary theological ethicists called‘proportionalists’ (e.g. Hallett 1995) have taken up thenatural law view with a consequentialist twist, denying (6). (For adiscussion of the relationship between proportionalism and natural lawtheory see Kaczor 2002.) And while some see Aristotle as being thesource of the natural law tradition, some have argued that his centralappeal to the insight of the person of practical wisdom as setting thefinal standard for right action precludes the possibility of the sortof general rules that would (at least in a theistic context) makeAristotle's ethics a natural law position. There is of course no clearanswer to the question of when a view ceases to be a natural lawtheory, though a nonparadigmatic one, and becomes no natural lawtheory at all.


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