This argument should be distinguished from a similar‘conceivability’ argument, often known as the ‘zombiehypothesis’, which claims the imaginability and possibility of mybody (or, in some forms, a body physically just like it) existingwithout there being any conscious states associated with it. (See, forexample, Chalmers (1996), 94–9.) This latter argument, if sound, wouldshow that conscious states were something over and above physicalstates. It is a different argument because the hypothesis thatthe unaltered body could exist without the mind is not thesame as the suggestion that the mind might continue to exist withoutthe body, nor are they trivially equivalent. The zombie argumentestablishes only property dualism and a property dualist might thinkdisembodied existence inconceivable—for example, if he thoughtthe identity of a mind through time depended on its relation to a body(e.g., Penelhum 1970).


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